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In empirical analysis of economic games, researchers frequently wish to estimate
quantities describing group outcomes, such as the expected revenue in an auction or the
mean allocative efficiency in a market experiment. For such applications, we propose an
improved statistical estimation technique called “recombinant estimation.” The technique
takes observations of the complete strategy of each player and recombines them to
compute all the possible group outcomes which could have resulted from different
matches of players. We calculate the improvement in efficiency of the recombinant
estimator relative to the standard estimator, and show how to estimate standard errors for
the recombinant estimator for use in hypothesis testing. We present an application to a
two-player sealed-bid auction and a two-player ultimatum bargaining game. In these
applications, the improved efficiency of our estimator is equivalent to an increase of
between 40% and 200% in the sample size. We discuss how to design game experiments
in order to be able to take full advantage of recombinant estimation. Finally, we discuss
practical computational issues, showing how one can avoid combinatorial explosions of
computing time while still yielding significantly improved efficiency of estimation.
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1.  Introduction
Economists frequently study behavior in simultaneous-move games with multiple
players, from auctions to Bertrand oligopoly to public-good provision. Recent interest in
behavioral game theory has generated a wealth of experimental data on individuals’ play
in a wide variety of such games. Data on the strategies chosen by players can be used to
make inferences about various quantities of economic interest, such as auction revenues,
market prices, and levels of public-good provision. Often, experiments on multi-player
games have each subject randomly and arbitrarily grouped with anonymous opponents. In
such simultaneous-move games with arbitrary groupings, it seems reasonable to assume
that each player’s strategy is unaffected by the identities of her rivals. This assumption
implies that the hypothetical game outcomes which would result from grouping a subject
with players she did not actually face are just as valid as the game outcome resulting from
the group of players she did play against. In this paper, we develop an estimation
technique, which we call “recombinant estimation,” designed to extract maximal
information from observed strategies in order to estimate various properties of
simultaneous-move games.
For concreteness, we present the example that originally motivated this paper.
List and Lucking-Reiley (1999) performed an experiment to compare two different
sealed-bid auction formats.
1 They conducted 15 identical two-person, uniform-price
auctions for the same good, obtaining data from a total of 30 bidders, all of whom faced
the identical bidding situation. They repeated this procedure with 30 additional bidders in
15 different Vickrey auctions. To compare the two auction formats, they conducted t-
tests, which involve estimating both the mean and the standard error of the mean for each
auction. Recall that with n independent observations, the standard deviation of the mean
equals the standard deviation of the data divided by the square root of n.  In order to test
                                                          
1 We return to this example in more detail in Section 4.2
whether the mean bids were equal across auction formats, they computed the mean bid,
and computed the standard error as the standard deviation divided by the square root of
30. They also compared revenues across auction formats, but since there were only 15
revenue observations (15 auctions with 2 bidders each), the standard error for this case
was equal to the standard deviation divided only by the square root of 15. This seemed
somehow unfair, as the same amount of information led to relatively higher standard
errors for revenues than for bids.
This observation led us to realize that in a sealed-bid auction, the pairings of
bidders were arbitrary, so we could observe the revenues that would have resulted from
all 435 possible pairings (the number of combinations of 30 bidders taken two at a time).
Computing the mean over these 435 different revenue observation clearly gives a more
precise estimate of the mean revenue in the population of auctions with all possible
bidders, since it uses more information. But what should be the standard error of the
mean?  Surely one can’t just divide the standard deviation by the square root of 435;
there’s not that much information available! In this paper, we formalize the intuition just
discussed, presenting a recombinant estimator for use in a variety of normal-form game
applications, and deriving correct standard error estimates so that the estimator may be
used for inference purposes.
Initially, we develop the implications of including these hypothetical pairings for
two-player symmetric games in which the econometrician observes the complete strategy
of each player. After illustrating the intuition for the results in this simplified context, we
present an extension to k-player symmetric games. Next, we remove the assumption of
symmetry, considering two-player and k-player asymmetric games.  In asymmetric
games, the possibilities for recombination are still present, but more limited.  Finally, we
present an estimator for the general case of a normal form game, which may include
some players who are symmetric and other who are asymmetric with respect to each
other.3
We apply this new technique in two empirical examples. First, we compare
Vickrey versus uniform-price sealed-bid auctions, using data from List and Lucking-
Reiley (1999). The results show efficiency improvements of 28 to 68 percent under the
new estimation technique, depending on the quantity estimated, which is roughly
equivalent to increasing the sample size by 40 to 200 percent.
In our second application, we compute the expected profit to different strategies
in a bargaining game, using data from Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993). Although a
bargaining game does not usually involve simultaneous moves, Mitzkewitz and Nagel
use the “strategy method” to elicit complete contingent strategies, converting this
extensive-form, sequential-move game into a normal-form, simultaneous-move game.
The recombinant technique yields estimates 30 to 50 percent more efficient than the
baseline (non-recombinant) estimator. Mitzkewitz and Nagel themselves computed
recombinant estimates of expected profits, thus anticipating our work. We extend their
results by putting their estimates into a general econometric framework, showing how to
compute standard errors for these estimates, and computing the efficiency of their
estimates relative to a baseline estimator.
We also consider the implications of our technique for the design of experiments.
Some previous game experiments lend themselves easily to this estimation technique,
while others do not. We discuss the classic auction experiment of Kagel, Harstad, and
Levin (1987) as an example of the latter type, and show how the experiment could easily
be redesigned in order to take full advantage of recombinant estimation.  The key is to
make sure that players face the same public environment in each session of the
experiment, so that they may be recombined across sessions.
Finally, we discuss practical computational considerations. Recombinant
estimation can involve a combinatorial explosion in the number of computations
required. Depending on the number of players per group, a few dozen actual observations
might spawn trillions of hypothetical observations to be computed. We show that one can4
achieve almost all of the efficiency gains of recombinant estimation by considering only
a random sample of several thousand of the hypothetical observations, an estimation task
readily achieved by modern computers in seconds or less. Similar practical considerations
apply to the estimation of standard errors for the estimator, where the combinatorial
explosions are even more rapid than in the computation of the estimator itself.
Recombinant estimation bears some similarities to the statistical technique of
bootstrapping, so it may be worth pointing out the differences. Bootstrapping provides a
two-step procedure to estimate numerically the sampling distribution of an estimator
whose distribution is impractical to compute analytically. The bootstrap first estimates
the data-generating process from the empirical distribution of the data, and then uses
Monte Carlo simulations of the data-generating process to estimate the sampling
distribution of the estimator. Like bootstrapping, the technique involves reusing data in a
method not practical before the advent of modern computing. But recombinant estimation
constitutes a new, more efficient estimator for a population parameter, while
bootstrapping is a method for doing inference with an existing estimator. Another
contrast is that recombinant estimator does not involve simulated observations; it
involves only the actual data observed by the econometrician. The crucial idea of the
recombinant estimator is to consider the way individual strategies are combined to
produce group outcomes, and to compute hypothetical outcomes which could have
resulted from the observed strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the
estimator and its distribution. Section 3 provides two empirical examples of the estimator.
Section 4 discusses how to design experiments in order to take advantage of this
estimation technique. Section 5 presents practical computational considerations in the
presence of an explosive number of recombinations. Finally, Section 6 concludes.5
2.  Estimators for Game Outcomes
In this section, we develop our recombinant estimator for the expected value of a group
outcome in a simultaneous-move game. We start with relatively simple games, and add
more generality in later subsections. In each case we consider, the estimator is always a
sample average that satisfies the conditions of the central limit theorem, so it has an
asymptotically normal sampling distribution.
Before developing the estimator in detail, we introduce some basic notation.
Assume that the econometrician observes n groups of k players each, and let mn k =
denote the total number of players. Let  xi  be the strategy observed for the ith player, with
i taking on any integer value from 1 to m. Let  pj  be the vector of players who
participated in group j. For concreteness, we might think of the first group of players as
pk 1 12 = ,, ,   , the second group of players as  pkk k 2 122 =+ + ,, ,   , and so on, up
to the kth group of players  pm km k m k =− + − + 12 ,, ,   . We can then write  pjt  to
represent the tth player in group j. Define  yj  as the outcome which results from the
strategies played by the set of players  pj , and let g be the function which maps strategies
to group outcomes, so that  yg xx x jp p p jj j k =
12 ,, ,   . Note that both xi  and  yj  might be
vectors, but for ease of exposition, we assume  yj  to be a scalar in this paper. Note further
that the group outcome may be any function of the players' strategies which the
econometrician might care to study. In particular, g is constrained to be neither
differentiable nor continuous.
The researcher’s goal is to estimate the expected value of y, the group outcome, in
the entire population of possible players. Let y have a mean of µ  and a variance of σ
2.
2
For comparison to the recombinant estimator, we first present the baseline estimator most
commonly observed in practice. This baseline estimator is the sample average outcome
                                                          
2 Note that the outcome variable y is itself a random variable since it is a function of random variables (the
strategies xi).6
across the n independent groups of players. That is, the baseline estimator involves
computing the group outcome for each of the n groups, and computing the simple
average of these n outcomes. We denote this baseline estimator by:
 µ ==





where j indexes the n groups. The variance of this estimator is
var yn  = σ
2 . (2-2)
This estimator will be our reference point for efficiency comparisons to other proposed
estimators.
In the following subsections, we first develop our recombinant estimator for
symmetric two-player games, then generalize it to symmetric k-player games. We next
develop a recombinant estimator for fully asymmetric 2-player games, and then
generalize to asymmetric k-player games. The special cases provide a simplified setting
in which to explain the intuition behind the recombinant estimation strategy. In the final
subsection, we develop a general recombinant estimator for any k-player normal-form
game, where each player may have symmetry with respect to some rivals but asymmetry
with respect to others.
2.1  Symmetric Two-Player Games
Suppose we observe four players matched in two pairs in a two-player, symmetric game.
Let  y1 represents the outcome for players 1 and 2, and  y2 represents the outcome for
players 3 and 4. For convenience, we introduce the notation  y ij ,   to represent the
outcome resulting when players i and j play against each other, so that  yy 1 12 = ,   and
yy 2 34 = ,  . Using the baseline estimator, the expected outcome would be estimated by the
average of  y 12 ,   and  y 34 ,  . However, one might be able to improve upon this estimator
by considering alternative combinations of the players. In particular, the potential
pairings {{1,3},{1,4},{2,3},{2,4}} and their associated outcomes are completely ignored7





















  . (2-3)
Note that the second summation runs from 1 to i − 1 to avoid including both  y ij ,   and
y ji ,  . Due to the symmetry in the outcome function these two outcomes correlate
perfectly, so  y ji ,   adds no new information once  y ij ,   has been considered. There are
mm − 12   terms in the double summation; the above formula divides the sum by the
number of terms in order to arrive at the sample average.
We have chosen to ignore the hypothetical outcomes which would result from
matching a given player with herself. In some applications, the researcher may find it
appropriate to include additional terms of the form  y ii ,   in the estimator of the mean. The
additional information would improve the efficiency of the estimator in small samples,
but the effect is negligible in large samples, as the number of  y ii ,   terms becomes
negligible relative to the total number of  y ij ,   terms. The two approaches are thus
asymptotically equivalent, and we have chosen to ignore the  y ii ,   terms for clarity of
exposition. It is relatively straightforward, though notationally cumbersome, to adapt the
equations in this paper to include these terms.
Some additional notation is required to present the variance of this estimator. Let
ϕ ≡ cov , ,, yy ij ik     for all  jk ≠ . Also, note that cov , ,, yy ij kl    = 0 when i, j, k and l
are all unique. Then,8
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In general, for two pairs of players which share one player in common, we expect the
covariance between the two outcomes to be positive. It is theoretically possible for the
covariance to be zero, but negative values are ruled out by the symmetry of the outcome
function g. For example, if bidder 1 in an auction bids relatively high, then an auction
between bidders 1 and 2 and an auction between bidders 1 and 3 will both tend to have
high revenues, and both will tend to have low revenues if bidder 1 bids relatively low.
From equation (2-4) it is clear that the variance of   µ  converges at rate  n  to
2ϕ . Recall that the asymptotic variance of the baseline estimator converges at rate  n  to
σ





. Proposition 1 in the following section proves
that 2
2 ϕσ ≤ , so the recombinant estimator is never less efficient than the baseline
estimator.
Note that for the special case where ϕ = 0 (which can happen for some
distributions of strategies x together with some functional forms of the outcome function
g), the recombinant estimator dominates the baseline estimator even more strongly. When
ϕ = 0, the asymptotic variance of   µ  converges at rate n to σ
2 2, while the baseline
estimator converges only at rate  n .
For inference purposes, it is important to be able to estimate the variance of the
estimator. To do this, one can use all the hypothetical outcomes  y ij ,   to produce
estimates of σ
2 and of ϕ , and then substitute these estimated values for the population9
parameters in the variance formula above. We will present more details on computing
estimated standard errors in section 6.2 of the paper.
2.2  Symmetric K-Player Games
With more than two players in a symmetric game, there are many more recombinations
possible. Instead of merely mm− 12   different hypothetical outcomes from the m
players, we now have the number of combinations of m objects taken k at a time. Recall
that  pj  represents the set of players in group j. For the baseline estimator, j indexed only
those groups actually observed, so it ranged only from 1 to n. Now we let P represent the
collection of all possible k-player sets which can be taken from the m players, and let j
index all the elements of P, so that j now ranges from 1 to J! ! ! ≡− mk mk    . In this














Note that the estimator in the previous subsection is a special case here: for k = 2, we
have J =− mm 12   terms in the summation.
To compute the asymptotic variance of this estimator, we again need to account
for the fact that when two groups have at least one overlapping player, their outcomes are
not independent observations, so there is some covariance between them. In principle, we
might expect two groups with more than one overlapping player, such as {1,2,3} and
{1,2,4} to have a higher outcome covariance than two groups with just a single
overlapping player, such as {1,2,3} and {1,4,5}. However, it becomes cumbersome to
keep track of the k − 1 different types of covariances, and it turns out to be sufficient to
consider the average covariance, denoted by ϕ , between any two groups that overlap by
at least one player:
ϕ ≡∩ ≠ ∅ ≠ Ey y p p p p iji j i j cov ,     and  (2-6)10
where the expectation is taken with respect to the relative frequency with which each
possible combination of repeated players occurs. Note that since each player's strategy is
independent of all other players' strategies, when there is no intersection between two
groups of players the covariance is zero.
The asymptotic variance of the estimator is:
var  J var cov ,






































































The efficiency of this estimator relative to the baseline estimator is kϕσ
2 .
Again, for the special case where ϕ = 0, the recombinant estimator dominates the
baseline estimator even more strongly, because it converges at rate n
k 2 while the
baseline converges only at rate n
12.
2.3  Asymmetric Two-Player Games
In an asymmetric game, each rival player takes on a different role: buyer versus seller,
bargain proposer versus responder, etc. In this case, there are fewer opportunities for
recombination, because groupings are constrained always to take one player from each
player type.
3 There are only m/2 choices for the first player in each pair, and m/2
                                                          
3 One way to increase the number of recombinations would be to put each player in both possible player
roles, and elicit a player’s strategy for both cases. This would in a sense restore symmetry, and allow many
more recombinations.  It is straightforward to adapt our estimator for this possibility, but because this11
choices for the second player, for a total of only J == mn
22 4  possible pairs, by
comparison J =− mm 12   in the symmetric case.
Let S1 be the set of individuals who played in the first player role, while S2 is the
set of individuals who played in the second player role. For concreteness, we can think of
S1 as the set of odd numbers no greater than m, and S2 as the set of even numbers no
greater than m. As before, let P represent the set of all possible pairs of players who could
have been matched against each other: P, =∈∈ iji S j S   12 and . As noted above,
there are n
2 elements in P. Letting  pj  represent the jth element of P, the recombinant














To compute the variance of the recombinant estimator, we again need to consider
covariances between terms which are not independent. For the asymmetric game, there
are two different types of covariance to consider: covariance between outcomes which
have the same first player, and covariance between outcomes which have the same
second player:
(1) ϕ 1 ≡ cov , yy ij   for all ij ≠ such that  pp ij 11 =
(2) ϕ 2 ≡ cov , yy ij   for all ij ≠ such that  pp ij 22 =
Then the asymptotic variance of the estimator is:
                                                                                                                                                                            
elicitation strategy is rare in practice and makes notation more cumbersome, we assume in this paper that
































































. We will show in
Proposition 1 that ϕ ϕ σ 12
2 +≤ , so the recombinant estimator is never less efficient than
the baseline estimator. Notice that if the game were symmetric, then ϕ ϕ 12 =  and the





, exactly what we derived for the case of 2-player
symmetric games.
4
As before, in the special case ϕ ϕ 12 0 == , the recombinant estimator converges
at rate n, while the baseline estimator converges at  n .
2.4  Fully Asymmetric K-Player Games
The generalization from 2–player asymmetric games to k-player asymmetric games is
reasonably straightforward. We assume that the game is fully asymmetric, in the sense
that each of the k different players enters the outcome function in a unique way. We will
relax this assumption in section 2.5.
Generalizing the notation of the previous section, let Si be the set of individuals
who played in the ith player role. Then, the set of all possible groups of players becomes:
P, , , , =∈ ∀ ∈ ii i S j k kj j 1 1      . There are J = n
k  elements in P. Letting  pj
represent the jth element of P, the recombinant estimator can be written as:
                                                          
4 This result implies that restricting players to their original position in symmetric games, i.e. not allowing
players who were initially in the same position to play against each other, does not reduce the asymptotic















The asymptotic variance of the estimator is:


































The efficiency of this estimator relative to the baseline estimator is kϕ σ
2 .
Again, for the special case where ϕ = 0, the recombinant estimator converges at rate n
k 2
while the baseline converges only at rate n
12.
2.5  General K-Player Games
Some games of interest have both symmetry and asymmetry between players. For
example, in a sealed-bid double-auction call market with b buyers and s sellers, the
buyers are all symmetric to each other (they each have the same strategy space), and the
sellers are all symmetric to each other, but there is asymmetry between buyers and
sellers. Such a game has symmetry within player roles, but asymmetry between player
roles.
Let t be the number of player roles and ti  be the number of players of type i in
each group, e.g., t = 2, tb 1 =  and ts 2 =  in the double-auction example above. As before,
let Si be the set of individuals who played in the ith player role, e.g., S1 contains all of
the buyers in the above example. Then, the set of all possible groups of players becomes:
P, , , , , , , , * =∈ ∀ ∈ ii ii i S j t tt t t j j t 11 1 1 1 1        .
Let J index the elements of P and  pj  represent the jth element of P. Then, the














The asymptotic variance of the estimator is:



































The efficiency of this estimator relative to the baseline estimator is kϕ σ
2 .
Again, for the special case where ϕ = 0, the recombinant estimator converges at rate n
k 2
while the baseline converges only at rate n
12.
3.  Theoretical Results on Recombinant Estimation
In this section, we present two propositions. The first proposition computes an upper
bound on the size of the covariance term ϕ  in k-player games. A corollary to this
proposition is that the recombinant estimator is always at least as efficient as the baseline
estimator. The second proposition describes under what circumstances the recombinant
estimator’s efficiency is greater than, rather than equal to, the efficiency of the baseline
estimator.
Proposition 1 states that the average covariance between group outcomes which
share overlapping strategies is less than one k
th of the variance of the group outcome
function:
Proposition 1: ky ϕ ≤ var .
Proof: See Appendix.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 1 is that the recombinant estimator is always at
least as efficient as the baseline estimator:15
Corollary 1: The relative efficiency of the recombinant estimator, ky ϕ var , is less
than or equal to one.
Proof: A direct application of Proposition 1.
Furthermore, the proof of Proposition 1 illustrates under what conditions the
recombinant estimator is strictly more efficient than the baseline estimator. In particular,
it is sufficient that the outcome function is not an additively separable function of the
strategies, i.e.  yg x x g x g x jp p p k p jj k j j k =≠ + +
11 1 ,,       .
5
Proposition 2: var  var µ  ≤ y  with equality if and only if the outcome function is
additively separable in the strategies.
Proof: Additive separability is required by property one used in the proof of Proposition
1.
Proposition 2 indicates that recombinant estimation provides strict efficiency
gains for many different group outcome functions. The only exception is where the
outcome is a linearly separable function of the players’ strategies. To illustrate an
example of this exception, suppose one is interested in the overall efficiency (relative to
the Pareto optimum) which can be obtained in a public-good-contribution game. The
game might involve k players each endowed with 100 units of money, which they can
either keep or contribute to the public good. When player i contributes  xi  to the public
good, that money gets doubled and then divided equally among the players for their
payoffs. In this game, the  xi s are the strategies, and the group outcome is the total payoff
to all players. The total payoff is equal to the total amount of public good provided plus






Since this is linear in the strategies, this game satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2, so
                                                          
5 If complete strategy  information is gathered to allow for recombination across player roles, then
asymmetry across player roles in the playoff function is also sufficient for the recombinant estimator to be
strictly more efficient, i.e. gi not equal to gj for at least one pair of i and j.16
there is no efficiency gain to be had. Intuitively, since the group outcome just involves
summing up the individual outcomes, the recombinant estimator turns out to be
numerically equivalent to the baseline estimator – it includes each term in the sum
multiple times, but the average turns out to be exactly the same. For recombinant
estimation to be useful, the group outcome of interest must not be linearly separable in
the strategies. In the next section, we demonstrate two examples where the outcome
function is nonlinear in the strategies, and compute the gains that occur. The first
example is a symmetric game, while the second is an asymmetric game.
4.  Applied Examples
We present two examples of recombinant estimation. First, we estimate expected
revenues and the allocation of goods in multi-unit auctions, from experiments by List and
Lucking-Reiley (1999). Second, we consider expected earnings of players in an
ultimatum bargaining game, from experiments by Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993).
4.1  Auctions
List and Lucking-Reiley (1999, henceforth LLR) compared two different sealed-bid
auction experiments in an experiment at a sportscard trading show. Each of the 328
different bidders participated in a single two-bidder, two-unit auction for sportscards,
with the items’ book values ranging from $3 to $70. Half the bidders bid in auctions with
the uniform-price highest-rejected-bid price rule, while the other half bid in auctions with
the generalized Vickrey price rule. Each auction offered a pair of identical sportscards,
and each bidder had the opportunity to submit two bids (one for each of the units of the
good). After collecting the bid sheets from individuals over a period of several hours, the
auctioneer randomly paired up individuals from the same type of auction in order to
compute the results. Bidders were asked to return to the same booth at an appointed time
in order to learn the results of the auction and conduct the transaction for any cards they
had won.17
LLR had four main results. First, second-unit bids were lower in the uniform-
price treatment than in the Vickrey treatment, as predicted by Nash equilibrium theory.
Second, first-unit bids were higher in the uniform-price treatment than in the Vickrey
treatment, an effect unpredicted by theory. Third, the allocations of goods were
significantly different across auction formats, with the uniform-price treatment resulting
in more split allocations while the Vickrey treatment more frequently both cards went to
the same bidder. Fourth, there was no statistically significant difference in revenues
across auction formats. LLR's first two results involved analyses of the mean levels of
bids. Since bids are individual strategies rather than group outcomes, recombinant
estimation cannot improve econometric efficiency for mean bid levels.  However, the last
two results involve quantities (revenues and allocations) which are group outcomes.
Since each bidder made his bids independently, we can use the rematching techniques of
the present paper to provide improved estimates of the mean revenues and the proportion
of split allocations for each auction format.
Tables 1 and 2 compare the baseline, nonrecombinant estimates presented by LLR
with new, recombinant estimates of the same quantities.  Table 1 presents results for the
proportion of split allocations in each auction.  There are results for ten different auction
treatments: five Vickrey, and five uniform-price (the five different treatments involved
different goods and different types of bidders, as shown in the rows of the table). Moving
from the baseline to the recombinant estimator, the point estimates change by moderate
amounts either up or down, and the standard errors uniformly become smaller. On
average, the estimated variance of the recombinant estimator is 67.3 percent smaller than
that of the baseline estimator. The efficiency improvement substantially increases the
power of the t-test of the hypothesis that Vickrey and uniform-price auctions produce
equivalent allocations; for example, the two-tailed p-value for this test in the first
treatment (Sanders 1989, Nondealers) decreases from 0.04 with the baseline estimator to18
0.0001 with the recombinant estimator.  The improvement in efficiency is equivalent to
more than a threefold increase in the sample size!
Table 2 presents similar results for auction revenues. Again, the standard errors
generally decrease when moving from the baseline to the recombinant estimator, but in
one of the ten treatments (Montana 1982, Dealers) the standard error actually increases
with the recombinant estimator. As will be discussed in Section 6, this can happen
because recombinant estimation produces a more accurate estimate of the estimator’s
variance in addition to the more accurate estimate of the mean. Thus, it is likely that the
baseline estimator’s estimated standard error was too small, especially given that the
baseline estimate was based on a sample of only 10 auction revenue observations.
Overall, the estimated variance of the recombinant estimator is 28.2 percent smaller than
that of the baseline estimator. This improvement in efficiency is equivalent to about a 40
percent increase in the sample size.
4.2  Bargaining
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993) analyze the ultimatum game. Though a bargaining game
does not typically involve simultaneous moves, Mitzkewitz and Nagel use the “strategy
method” to collect data on complete contingent strategies, which converts the extensive-
form, sequential-move bargaining game into a normal-form, simultaneous-move game.
The basic idea of the ultimatum game is that Player A makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
split a cash-valued “cake” with Player B.  Player B either accepts the offer so that both
players earn the indicated amounts, or rejects the offer and both players receive nothing.
We consider the “demand form” of the game developed by Mitzkewitz and Nagel, in
which the cake size is known to Player A but unknown to Player B. All Player B knows
is the size of Player A’s demand, not the size of the cake or the relative fraction A has
demanded. The specific rules of the game are as follows:
1)  The cake may be one of six sizes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 Taler, a fictitious currency
worth approximately 70 cents.19
2)  Player A commits to an offer to player B for each of the six possible cake sizes.
Offers are restricted to be an element of the set  0 05 10 55 60 ,. ,. , ,. ,.    and cannot
exceed the size of the cake.
3)  Meanwhile, player B, with no knowledge of the cake size, decides which of the
possible demands from zero to six she will accept, and which she will reject.
4)  After both players have committed to their strategies, a die is rolled to determine
the actual size of the cake. Given the cake size, player A’s demand is revealed to
player B, who either accepts or rejects it according to her previously elicited
strategy. If accepted, player A receives what he demanded and player B receives
the remainder of the cake. If rejected, both players receive zero.
This setting fits well the estimation technique of this paper. In fact, Mitzkewitz and Nagel
themselves computed recombinant estimates of expected profits in their analysis (pg.
179). However, they did not provide standard errors of their estimates, nor did they
evaluate the econometric efficiency of the procedure, so we extend their work in this
direction. Table 3 contains the recombinant estimates,
6 their associated standard errors
and the relative efficiency gain of recombinant estimator.
7
                                                          
6 The point estimates presented in the table differ very slightly from those in Mitzkewitz and Nagel. The
difference is attributable to the fact that Mitzkewitz and Nagel computed their estimates by hand.
7 The experiment involved eight repeated trials, with each player facing a different rival each round (there
were eight proposers and eight responders in each experimental session).  Following Mizkewitz and Nagel,
we recombine not just across individuals, but also across these rounds.  It would be inappropriate to assume
that the same individual’s play is independent across different rounds, so we estimate our standard errors
conservatively.  We assume that there exists some positive covariance between observations involving the
same player in different rounds, distinct from the positive covariance already assumed to exist between
observations using the strategy of the same player in the same round.  By estimating this new type of
covariance from the data, we provide corrected (larger) standard errors which take into account this lack of
independence.  For ease of exposition, we omit an explicit discussion of the equations used for this
purpose, which are a straightforward generalization of the equations already presented.20
This estimation produces two interesting results. First, recombinant estimation
yields a 16 and a 65 percent efficiency gains for the expected profits of players A and B,
respectively. The greater gains are realized at the higher cake sizes (where the strategy
space is relatively rich). These numbers, computed as in equation (2-9) above, indicate
the decreased variance of the recombinant estimator relative to the baseline estimator (the
simple average over only the realized pairings of players). Second, the estimated standard
errors allow us to test an interesting hypothesis: whether the expected profit to player A is
monotonically increasing in the cake size. Mitzkewitz and Nagel note that the estimated
expected payoff to player A takes a maximum at cake size four and decreases from that
point onward, so the point estimates look as if player A’s profits are not monotonic in the
cake size. However, they were unable to complete a formal test of this hypothesis,
because they did not know the distribution of their estimates. The estimated expected
revenue decreases by approximately 0.128 from a cake of size four to one of size six. The
t-statistic for this change is 1.88, so we are able to reject at the 10% significance level the
hypothesis that type-A players’ profits are monotonically increasing in the cake size.
Furthermore, the t-statistic associated with the baseline estimator is only 1.13, which
would be insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, in this example the
recombinant estimation technique generates a formal rejection of the null hypothesis even
though standard estimation techniques cannot do so.
5.  Implications for Experimental Design
Our results show that recombinant estimation can produce drastic improvements in
efficiency for estimating group outcomes from experimental data on auctions and other
simultaneous-move games. There are also implications for the design of experiments.
First, as noted above, recombinant estimation can be used anytime complete strategies are
available. Therefore, experimenters who wish to take advantage of recombinant
estimation in sequential games may wish to consider the use of the strategy method to21
elicit complete contingent strategies, in order to have the right kind of data. Second, the
experimenter needs to make sure that experimental conditions are held constant across
experimental sessions in a way that allows for recombination. In the remainder of this
section, we consider an example of an important experiment whose design could have
been changed slightly along these lines, in order to generate data suitable for recombinant
estimation.
Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987, henceforth KHL) test the theory of auctions
with affiliated private values, with six bidders per auction, in a laboratory setting. Several
of their experimental results involve estimates of nonlinear functions of all six bids; such
estimates are prime candidates for improvement through our proposed technique. For
example, they present a test of the key theoretical prediction that second-price sealed-bid
auctions raise higher revenues than first-price auctions. In two of the three treatment
conditions the difference is statistically insignificant, with high standard errors.
Recombinant estimation could have reduced the variance of the estimated revenues in
each auction type, improving the power of the hypothesis tests. Other examples in the
paper where this estimation technique could have improved efficiency include: (1)
comparing first-price auction revenues with and without public information, (2)
measuring the effects of public information on efficiency, and (3) comparing average
bidder profits when private values have high versus low variance.
In each experimental auction, KHL used the following procedure. First, they
chose a locational parameter  x0 randomly from a uniform distribution on [$25, $125].
Second, they chose a set of six private values  xi  for the six bidders, with each  xi  drawn
independently from the uniform distribution on [ x0 − ε , x0 + ε ], where ε  was a constant
equal to either $6, $12, or $24, depending on the round of the experiment. Each bidder
learned his private value  xi , but did not necessarily learn the value of  x0, so he might
remain uncertain about the distribution from which his value came. This generated
“affiliation” between bidders’ values, as described by Milgrom and Weber (1982). That22
is, when a bidder learns that his value is high, he also learns that other bidders’ values are
likely to be relatively high.
After telling subjects their induced values  xi , KHL invited them to submit bids in
an auction. Next they determined the winner of the auction, the price to be paid, and the
profits earned by the winner, and informed the subjects of the results. They repeated this
procedure for each round of the experiment, with 24 to 31 rounds per experimental
session. Each session took place with a new group of six bidders, totaling seven sessions
of first-price auctions and two sessions of second-price auctions. (KHL also report on
sessions of English clock auctions, but their dynamic English auction cannot be
represented as a normal-form game, so it is beyond the scope of this paper.)
KHL compute the difference between the observed first-price auction revenues
and the theoretical revenues predicted by risk-neutral Nash equilibrium, and compute the
mean of this value. (They compute the theoretical revenues separately for each realization
of bidders’ private values in the experiment.) They do the same thing for second-price
auctions, and then compare the two means in a hypothesis test. Recombinant estimation
might yield considerable improvement in the estimation of these means. Considering just
a single round of the first-price auctions, the technique would involve taking the mean
over 5.2 million different hypothetical revenue observations (combinations of 42
different subjects chosen six at a time), instead of the seven observed revenue
observations. The exact amount of efficiency improvement would depend on the actual
distribution of the data, but it is likely to be quite large.
The above example just considers a single round of the experiment. Recombinant
estimation could be performed separately for each of the two dozen rounds of the
experiment.  One could even consider combining across rounds as well, with each bid in
each round considered an independent draw from the population of bidding strategies.  Of
course, independence is a strong assumption, but it may be relaxed (as noted in footnote
6) to allow for correlation of strategies made by the same bidder in different rounds.23
Recombination across rounds will sometimes not be possible at all; for example, one
clearly would not want to combine across rounds with different values of ε .  For their
hypothesis tests KHL compute means both across groups and across rounds (only those
rounds with the same values of ε ). With 20 rounds of observations of 42 different
bidders, the analogous recombinant estimator would involve trillions of different
hypothetical revenue observations for each value of ε .
However, the locational parameter  x0 makes it impossible to recombine across
rounds.  Each different round of the experiment drew a different value of  x0and bids
submitted in response to different values of  x0 are not comparable to each other. For
example, bids submitted when  x0=$40 could not be combined with bids submitted when
x0=$80, because the resulting revenues would be meaningless – such revenues could
never actually result from a single auction.  So separate estimation by round is required,
which limits us to 5.2 million observations per round rather than trillions of observations
overall. This is a fundamental restriction of the experiment; it would not be possible to
study affiliated private values without having a location parameter  x0 that varied by
round. (By contrast, experiments with independent private values, such as Cox, Roberson
and Smith (1982) or Kagel and Levin (1993) would allow recombinations across rounds.)
Unfortunately, the specific experimental design of KHL does not even allow us to
recombine across sessions within a single round. Because the value of the continuous
random variable  x0 was drawn independently across experimental sessions as well as
across rounds, there are no two groups of six bidders in the entire data set that can be
recombined with each other. In order to use the recombinant estimator, one would have to
redesign the experiment in the following way. Generate a set of random values of  x0 for
the 26 rounds of the first experimental session, and then reuse these same values for each
subsequent session. The values of  x0 remain random from the point of view of the
subsequent sets of bidders, even though they are predetermined from the experimenter’s
point of view. Note that it is not necessary to use the same set of individual values  xi  in24
each experimental session, because the bids from bidders with different individual
valuations could still be recombined, so long as the group-level parameters are the same.
In fact, it is preferable to generate different random outcomes for the bidder values across
sessions, because this would create a better representation of the full population to be
studied: all bidders who might possibly have bid in an auction with a particular value of
x0. Only the group parameters need to be held constant across experimental sessions.
When would it be appropriate to recombine strategies across rounds as well as
across independent groups of subjects?  Note that the recombinant estimator assumes that
strategies in different rounds are all draws from the same population.  For example, in
order to combine one individual’s strategy in round 2 with another individual’s strategy
in round 10, one must believe that there is no systematic change in play over time.  If,
however, systematic learning about the game takes place over time (for example, bidders
tend to gradually learn to bid lower), then one should not recombine across rounds, but
only across sessions within the same round number.  Another complication is the
possibility of learning not just about the game but also about one’s rival players: for
example, one group of players learns to submit high bids because they played against a
rival who bid unusually high in early rounds.  If subjects do learn in this way about their
specific group of rivals in repeated play, then any recombining across groups after the
first round would be inappropriate.
8  In order to be able to make use of recombinant
estimation in an experiment with repeated trials, the experimenter might wish to choose
an experimental design which minimizes the possibility for learning about one’s rivals.
For example, Mitzkewitz and Nagel’s experimental design ensured that over the eight
rounds of the experiment, no player ever played against the same rival twice.  Thus, in
section 5.2, we feel relatively sanguine about recombining across rounds for that
                                                          
8 It might be possible to construct a recombinant estimator which also controls for group effects of this
type, but this is beyond the scope of the present paper.25
experiment.  An even stronger insurance would be the “zipper design” sometimes used in
experiments, where in repeated rounds a player never comes into contact with anyone
who might have been influenced by that player previously (that is, one never plays one’s
previous rivals again, nor one’s rivals’ rivals, nor one’s rivals’ rivals’ rivals, and so on).
In an experiment with repeated trials, minimizing players’ repeated interactions with the
same opponents provides a way to make better use of recombinant estimation.
To summarize, we find three key implications of our work for experimental
design.  First, recombinant estimation can be used in dynamic games if the experimenter
can obtain complete contingent strategies.  Second, in order to recombine across groups
of players, all group-level parameters must be held constant for each group, though
individual-level parameters may vary.  Third, in order to use recombinant estimation in
an experiment with repeated trials, it is important to have an experimental design which
minimizes repeated contact between the same players.
6.  Computational Methods
As discussed in the previous section, if KHL had been able to recombine across sessions,
there would have been approximately 5.2 million combinations for each round. The
growth of the number of combinations becomes ever more explosive as the number k of
players per game increases. The same amount of data produces hundreds of combinations
in a two-bidder auction and millions of combinations in a six-bidder auction. Even a
relatively small number of observations (seven groups of six subjects each) can yield a
very large number of recombinations. This exponential growth in the number of
combinations could become computationally burdensome. Fortunately, it turns out that
the vast majority of the efficiency gain from recombinant estimation can be obtained
from a relatively small fraction of those possible recombinations. We show below that
100 combinations per player is usually sufficient. In KHL, this pares the full 5.2 million
combinations per round down to a mere 4,200 combinations.26
It turns out that this result is particularly important for computing estimated
standard errors. Estimating standard errors requires an estimate of the covariance term
phi, which itself can be computed via recombinant estimation with the “group outcome”
appropriately defined. If the number of players per game is k, then the number of players
per “group” in the estimation of ϕ  is 21 k −  (at least one player is in both groups), and
this large number of players can produce enormous numbers of possible combinations
when estimating standard errors. In practice, this turns out not to be a problem because a
very accurate estimate of ϕ  can be attained by considering a small subset of the possible
terms . Because computation of standard errors is such an important concept, we give that
topic its own subsection.  First, however, we consider the simpler topic of the
computation of point estimates.
6.1  Computationally Convenient Point Estimates
Another way to express the recombinant estimator is via iterated expectations.  Recalling
that P represents the set of all hypothetical groupings of the observed strategies, let Pi  be
the subset of P containing only those groups which include player i. That is,
PP ij j pi p =∈ ∈  . Let Ji  represent the number of elements in Pi . Now define  Eyi 
as the conditional expectation of y, restricted to groups containing player i. An estimate













Then the recombinant estimator can be expressed as the sum of these estimated
conditional expectation over all players i:











                                                          
9 Each  pj ∈ P  is in this summation k times. However, the sample average of J items is equal to the sample
average of those same J items replicated k times.27
In this section, we consider what happens if we estimate   Eyi   using less than
the full set Pi  of potential combinations involving player i. Suppose that we consider
using r different combinations involving player i, where r i ≤ J . When r = 1, we obtain
the baseline estimator, which involves no recombinations at all. Clearly, r = 1 gives a
poor estimate of   Eyi  . Including more recombinations allows the researcher to better
estimate   Eyi   for each player. Let   Ey i r  be the estimated expected value when r













where Ri  contains r random draws from Pi .
However, the gain to recombining is limited by the fact that all it provides is
better estimates of  Eyi  , it does not increase the number of expected values to be
considered. Therefore, the variance of the estimator is bounded below by the variance of









m  . (6-4)
Furthermore, the variance of the overall estimator is proportional to the var Eyi    plus
var  Eyi i   . Therefore, once the var  Eyi i    is small relative to var Eyi   , there
is not much to be gained by considering additional recombinations of the data.
























ji  . (6-5)
The variance can be written as








mr y m r E y y jj i . (6-6)
When  yj  and  yi share at least one common player, the average cov , yy ji   is ϕ . The
probability that  pj  and  pi share at least one player is asymptotically equal to
kr m
2 1 −   which is approximately equal to km
2 . So,28
var  µ








When r is equal to all possible combinations involving a particular player, then the first
term in the variance is of lower order and we recover the variance that was derived
earlier. However, if r is fixed, then the first term goes to zero at the same rate as the
second, so we have a less efficient estimator. In particular, the relative efficiency of the
recombinant estimator with r fixed with respect to the full blown recombinant estimator
is












 =+ . (6-8)
Alternatively, with respect to the baseline estimator the restricted alternative’s relative
efficiency is













which equals the relative efficiency of the recombinant estimator plus 1 kr .
The exact gain from increasing the number of combinations considered is a
function of the ratio between ϕ  and σ
2. Table 4 displays the relative efficiencies of the
baseline, recombinant and restricted estimators with r fixed at 50, 100 and 500. The table
illustrates two points. First, as the covariance across recombinations with shared players
decreases relative to the variance of the group outcome function, the potential gain from
recombining data increases. Second, since the gain to recombining data is great when the
covariance is small, the loss associated with restricting the estimator to consider r
recombinations is greater when the covariance is small, as illustrated by the final column
of the above table. In particular, consider the case where there are two players in the
game and the covariance is 0.01. Here, restricting ourselves to 100 combinations results
in a 25% efficiency loss relative to the recombinant estimator. However, we still capture
97.5% of the 98% efficiency gain relative to the baseline estimator.29
6.2  Computationally Convenient Standard-Error Estimates
Computation of standard errors for the recombinant estimator requires separately
estimating both σ
2 and ϕ , then substituting the results into the variance formula (2-13).
Both σ
2 and ϕ  can themselves be estimated via recombinant estimation, because they
are themselves means of different group outcomes.  To see this result, define a new
outcome as the squared deviation from the average value of the old outcome, i.e.
sy jj =−  µ 
2
. (6-10)
Then the average value of this new outcome is the sample variance of the original
outcome variable y, which makes it an estimate of the population variance σ
2. Since we
have now posed the estimation of σ
2 as the estimation of a mean value, we can use the
recombinant technique to estimate σ
2 more efficiently, computing this mean across all
possible k-player groups. Equivalently, one generates a recombinant estimate of σ
2by
generating the same J different hypothetical outcomes g(x) used to compute   µ , and
taking their sample standard deviation (whereas   µ  was their sample mean).
Recombinant estimation can also be used to estimate ϕ . To see this, let
Ω= ∈ ∩ ≠∅ pp p p ij i j ,P  . Define a group of players as ω ij i j pp =∈ ,  Ω  and the
outcome as:
hy y ij i j =− −  µµ   . (6-11)
Then ϕ  equals the expected value of this new outcome, restricted to observations where
at least one player overlaps between groups i and j. Thus, ϕ  is the expected value of a
new type of group outcome, where this time the group size is 2k-1 players (two different
groups of size k which are constrained to overlap by at least one player). Since ϕ  is the
average value of a new type of group outcome, it can be estimated with the recombinant
technique. In practice, to estimate ϕ  one generates two columns of data, each row of
which contains two different hypothetical outcomes which overlap by at least one player.30
After generating all such possible pairs of outcomes, one takes the sample covariance
between the two columns in order to estimate ϕ .
In general, recombinant estimation of ϕ  is the most computationally expensive
task we consider, because the number of such pairs of outcomes is of order n
k 21 − , rather
than the mere order n
k outcomes required for the recombinant estimator   µ  or for the
estimate of σ
2. Thus, in practical computation of standard errors, it can be even more
essential to restrict attention to a subset of the possible combinations. Section 6.1
demonstrates that 100 recombinations per player is usually sufficient to obtain most of
the gains from recombinant estimation. For practical purposes in estimating ϕ , we
recommend generating at least 100 random pairs of outcomes overlapping in player 1,
100 pairs overlapping in player 2, and so on up to player m, then computing the sample
covariance across all such pairs.
Because our estimate of σ
2 comes from recombinant estimation of an outcome
(see equation (6-10)) which is nonlinear in the strategies, we expect this estimate to be
strictly more efficient (see Proposition 2) than the standard non-recombinant estimate of
σ
2 taken across only observed groups. If this result leads to more accurate estimates of
the standard errors (recall that we have to estimate ϕ , as well as σ
2), then we will have
even greater power in hypothesis testing. This result, although not fully developed here,
is analogous to the power in a t-test. Recall that in a t-test, increasing the degrees of
freedom (while holding the point estimate and the population standard deviation
constant) also increases the power of the test. However, as with a t-test, the gain in power
to increasing the precision of the estimate of the variance is decreasing in the precision of
the original estimate. Thus, when the sample size is large, the recombinant and the simple
estimators of the variance will produce tests of the same power (just as a t-test with 500
degrees of freedom has essentially the same power as one with 1000 degrees of freedom).
Finally, because the recombinant and the baseline estimators use different
variance estimates, it is possible for the recombinant estimator to have a greater estimated31
variance than the baseline estimator. This possibility is realized in one of the empirical
examples (Table 2, Montana 1982, Dealers) in Section 4.
7.  Concluding Remarks
We have presented a new econometric estimator for use in applications where the
quantity of interest is a group outcome based upon the individual strategies of the players.
Our recombinant estimator considers all possible hypothetical groupings, yielding
considerable efficiency improvements relative to the standard estimator which considers
only the observed groupings. In the applied examples we have examined so far, we find
efficiency improvements equivalent to increases in the sample size of between 40 and
200 percent. Even greater efficiency improvements are possible in principle, but the exact
amount of improvement depends on both the functional form of the group outcome
function g, and on the distribution of the population of individual strategies. We have
shown our estimator guarantees some efficiency improvement so long as g is not
additively separable over the individual strategies  xi .
10
This estimation technique would not have been feasible before the advent of
modern computing, because calculating all possibly hypothetical outcomes requires
considerable computing power. The applications we have considered, with tens of
individual strategies and hundreds of possible groupings, have required less than a second
to compute each estimate on a 400MHz computer. However, larger samples (with
hundreds of individual strategy observations) can easily result in hundreds of trillions of
combinations to compute, so complete computation of all possible combinations might
overwhelm even today’s computers. Fortunately, we have also shown that complete
computation of all possible strategies is unnecessary; restricting attention to a
                                                          
10 Our intuition suggests that the efficiency improvements are greater in cases where g(x) is more highly
nonlinear and in cases where holding the total number of players fixed, the number of players per game is
greater, though we offer no formal proof of either conjecture.32
computationally manageable fraction of the possible combinations still yields almost all
of the possible efficiency gains of recombinant estimation. This computational result is
particularly useful for producing estimated standard errors for our estimator, which itself
turns out to be an application of recombinant estimation where the number of possible
combinations explodes very quickly.
Experiments on auctions and other normal-form games provide the most
straightforward applications of our technique. Recombinant estimation can yield lower-
variance estimates of such quantities as auction revenues, market efficiency, or the
fraction of the time players achieve the Nash equilibrium in a matrix game. This
technique may also help rescue data which might otherwise have become unusable when
an experiment goes wrong. For example, suppose that in a twelve-person, simultaneous-
move market experiment, one of the twelve participants leaves before submitting a
strategy. The market efficiency for that group of twelve subjects cannot be calculated,
because one can’t find the actual allocation when one of the strategies is missing.
However, the other eleven players all submitted valid strategies, so rather than throwing
out these observations, one may recombine them with the data from other sessions in
order to yield good market efficiency estimates.
11
We have illustrated the recombinant-estimation technique in two applications.
First, we have estimated revenues and allocations in two types of sealed-bid auction
formats, pointing out the efficiency improvements relative to the standard estimator. We
have also estimated the expected profits for each player in a bargaining game, and
illustrated a hypothesis test where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected without the use
of recombinant estimation. This latter example also illustrates how the technique may be
extended to sequential games, if the experimenter is willing to convert the game from
extensive form to normal form by eliciting complete contingent strategies from the
                                                          
11 We are grateful to Yan Chen for bringing this application to our attention.33
players via the strategy method. As we have also shown in the context of auctions, there
are other practical experimental design considerations which can make the difference
between being able to use recombinant estimation and not being able to use it.
The estimator also holds some promise beyond simultaneous-move game
experiments, and even beyond the field of economics. For example, consider a medical
statistician who wishes to estimate the average ratio between healing time with drug A
and healing time with drug B. Half the patients in the study received drug A, while the
other half received drug B. This situation is isomorphic to the estimation of a two-player
game, where the strategies are healing times and the outcome is the ratio between the
healing times of one patient and another. The recombinant estimator considers all
possible pairings of A-types with B-types, producing an estimate (and a standard error)
for this ratio. The technique might be used in any statistical situation which involves
matching or grouping of observations.
Future research might be able to generalize our results, for example by exploring
the properties of recombinant estimation when the econometrician expects within-group
fixed effects in repeated observations of the same group, or by finding additional
applications for recombinant estimation. Most importantly, we hope that our work, with
its discussions of the practical aspects of computation and of experimental design for use
with this technique, will enable other researchers to improve the efficiency of their
estimates of behavior in simultaneous-move games.
8.  Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
This appendix contains a proof that the recombinant estimator is weakly asymptotically
more efficient than the baseline estimator, i.e. Proposition 1. Furthermore, Proposition 2,
that the recombinant estimator is strictly more efficient when the group outcome function
is not additively separable in players' strategies, is proved as a special case. One lemma34
and two properties of functions of independent random variables are invoked in the proof.
Maintaining the notation of section 2, let
ϕ =∩ ≠ ∅ ≠ Ey y p p p p ij i j i j cov ,     and  .
The lemma states that the average covariance between groups with at least one common
player converges to the average covariance between groups with exactly one common
player. More precisely,
Lemma 1: lim
n→∞ = ϕ ψ  where ψ τ τ ≡∃ = Ey y t p p ij i t j cov , , :      exactly one pair  .
Proof: The number of pairs  yy ij ,   with exactly r repeated players is of order n
kr 2 − .
Therefore, the proportion of the population of pairs with shared players that share exactly
one player converges to one.
The two properties of functions of independent random variables are as follows:
1)  Let x be a random k-dimensional vector where  xi  is independent of  xj for all
ij ≠ . Then, for all  fRR
k x  : → , f can be expressed as
ff x f x kk xx      =+ ++ 11  δ
where  xi  is correlated with  fx ii   and uncorrelated with all other terms in f.
Furthermore,
corr , ff x ii
i
k





with equality if and only if δ x  = 0.
2)  Let x be a random variable, y and z be k-dimensional random vectors where x, y
and z are all independent of each other. Then, for all  fR R
k x  :
+ →
1
corr , , , corr , , corr , , fx fx fx f x fx f x xx yz y z          
22 2
=
where  fx x  is defined as in property (1).
Armed with these three results, we are prepared to prove Proposition 1, that the
recombinant estimator is weakly more efficiency than the standard estimator. In the
proof, we point out where the lack of additive separability in the group outcome function
leads to a strictly more efficient estimator, proving Proposition 2.35
PROPOSITION 1: Let xi  be independently and identically distributed random variables
and  yg x xR R jp p
k
jj k =→
1,, :   . Then, ϕ  is asymptotically less than or equal to one k
th
the var y  .
Proof: By lemma 1, it is sufficient to prove that the claim holds true when we restrict
attention to pairs of outcomes which share exactly one player.
Recall that each player is only repeated in the role in which she is observed and
that the game is symmetric within each player role. Therefore, without loss of generality,
assume that if a player participates in both  yi and  yj , she is in the same position in both
games. There are k player positions, so there are k equally likely types of terms that share
exactly one player with  yi in this manner:  yj
t  for tk = 1 to  , where  yj
t  indicates that a
player from the t
th position has been repeated in game j.
12 Note that  yj
t  is independent of
y j
τ  for all t ≠ τ  since the common player with group i differs and the remaining players
are drawn at random.
Let ρ ij t i j
t yy , corr , =  . By Property (2),
ρρ ρρ ij t gg gg gg tt t ,
22 2 4 == .
Therefore, the sum of the correlations over the k player positions is

















where the final inequality is a direct application of Property (1).
Note that the final inequality above becomes strict if  yg x x jp p jj k =
1,,    cannot
be expressed as an additively separable function of the elements of x, i.e. δ x  ≠ 0 in the
decomposition in property (1). Furthermore, a strict inequality will carry through to a
strict inequality in the statement of Proposition 1. This means a strictly more efficient
estimator, and thus proves Proposition 2.
                                                          
12 Each type is equally likely because the set of players is restricted to unique combinations where the order
of players within a player role does not matter, i.e. the set P in the notation of sub-section 2.5.36
Returning to the proof of Proposition 1, algebraic manipulation of the above
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Since lim cov ,







1   by lemma 1 and the fact that each type of
covariance in the summation is equally likely.37
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171 – 198.Trading Card LLR Recombinant LLR Recombinant
Barry Sanders 1989 Score; BV = $70 0.56 0.54 0.85 0.87
Nondealers (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05)
Cal Ripken 1982 Topps; BV = $70 0.23 0.31 0.87 0.89
Dealers (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
Jordan 1989 Hoops; BV=$3 0.32 0.35 0.54 0.52
Nondealers (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06)
Montana 1982 Topps; BV = $3 0.57 0.52 0.45 0.58
Dealers (0.14) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08)
Montana 1982 Topps; BV=$3 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.56
Nondealers (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.08)
Table 1
Proportion of Auctions with the Two Units Split Between the Two Bidders:
A Comparison of the Baseline and Recombinant Estimators
Vickrey Uniform
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)Trading Card LLR Recombinant LLR Recombinant
Barry Sanders 1989 Score; BV = $70 52.06 49.42 48.71 44.90
Nondealers (8.25) (5.83) (7.83) (6.00)
Cal Ripken 1982 Topps; BV = $70 72.87 73.86 76.13 73.86
Dealers (6.52) (5.69) (5.50) (5.11)
Jordan 1989 Hoops; BV=$3 1.13 1.11 1.71 1.72
Nondealers (0.30) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25)
Montana 1982 Topps; BV = $3 2.37 2.18 2.13 2.12
Dealers (0.42) (0.28) (0.34) (0.36)
Montana 1982 Topps; BV=$3 0.66 0.66 0.83 0.88
Nondealers (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.22)
Table 2
Average Revenue from Vickrey and Uniform Sealed Bid Auctions:
A Comparison of the Baseline and Recombinant Estimators
Vickrey Uniform
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)1 2 3 4 5 6
Player A
Point Estimate 0.783 1.441 1.874 1.945 1.916 1.816
(0.014) (0.031) (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.065)
Efficiency Gain 0.287 0.383 0.555 0.655 0.626 0.633
Player B
Point Estimate 0.167 0.327 0.525 0.910 1.248 1.528
(0.012) (0.022) (0.027) (0.034) (0.047) (0.064)
Efficiency Gain 0.164 0.210 0.262 0.388 0.404 0.451
Table 3
Mean Expected Payoffs for Demanders and Repliers in the Ultimatum Game
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
CakeNumber of Recombinant/ Restricted/ Restricted/
Players phi/sigma
2 Baseline Baseline Recombinant
50 Recombinations
2 0.250 0.500 0.510 1.020
2 0.100 0.200 0.210 1.050
2 0.010 0.020 0.030 1.500
5 0.100 0.500 0.504 1.008
5 0.010 0.050 0.054 1.080
100 Recombinations
2 0.250 0.500 0.505 1.010
2 0.100 0.200 0.205 1.025
2 0.010 0.020 0.025 1.250
5 0.100 0.500 0.502 1.004
5 0.010 0.050 0.052 1.040
500 Recombinations
2 0.250 0.500 0.501 1.002
2 0.100 0.200 0.201 1.005
2 0.010 0.020 0.021 1.050
5 0.100 0.500 0.500 1.001
5 0.010 0.050 0.050 1.008
Table 4
Relative Efficiency of the Computationally Restricted Estimator